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1. Introduction 
1. In the latter half of the 19th century, economic thought in the German- 
speaking world was dominated, both intellectually and academically, by the 
so-called historical school, from Wilhelm Roscher to Gustav Schmoller and 
others. In 1871, the Austrian Carl Menger published his Grun&tze der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre (Menger, 1976 (1871)), customarily referred to as one of 
the three simultaneous discoveries of marginalist economics-the other two 
marginalist ‘revolutionaries’ being Jevons in England and Walras in France.1 
Twelve years later, in 1883, Menger published a major methodological treatise 
entitled Untersuchungen iiber die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der 
Politischen Oekonomie insbesondere (Menger, 1963 (1883)). This book included 
criticisms of some of the historicist principles of doing economics. In the same 
year, Schmoller, leader of the German historicists, wrote a critical review of 
Menger’s book (Schmoller, 1883). Menger reacted forcefully with a more 
straightforwardly polemical small book, Die Irrthiimer des Historismus in der 
deutschen National6konomie (Menger, 1884). Commentaries by others appeared 
in later years, but this brief episode amounted to what has thereafter been called 
the Methodenstreit between Menger and Schmoller. It has been established as 
perhaps the most famous methodological controversy in the history of the 
social sciences. 
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2. Even if recognized as a major controversy, I believe the positions of the 
antagonists in the 1880s debate on method have not been satisfactorily 
understood by later generations. The standard perception of the controversy is 
in terms of an inductive, realistic, empirical, historical, holistic and ethical 
approach held by Schmoller vs a deductive, abstract, theoretical, aprioristic and 
individualistic approach espoused by Menger. This popular view lacks accuracy 
and clarity in details, it oversimplifies and overhomogenizes, and it is therefore 
misleading much of the time. Part of the reason for this is, of course, the 
ambiguity found in the original texts.2 
By focusing on one issue, namely that of universals and how they are dealt 
with by one party in the controversy, namely Menger, I hope to shed some new 
light on some aspects of the confrontation. I believe that some of the above 
oppositions misconstrue the debate. In particular, it will be shown that a theory 
can be abstract and realistic at the same time; that Menger’s approach is not 
aprioristic in the conventional sense; and that an economics does not have to be 
inductive in the sense of being based on enumerative induction in order to be 
empirical. In order to substantiate such suggestions, I adopt the perspective of 
an essentialist realism of an Aristotelean type when reading Menger’s writings. 
Menger’s foremost concern, as opposed to the historicist insistence on ground- 
ing all theory on detailed empirical information, was to defend the possibility 
of a relatively autonomous theoretical economics. He tried to accomplish this 
by suggesting that theoretical economics is an exact science, involving what he 
called exact types and exact laws. It is this notion of economics as an exact 
science that I want to clarify.3 
3. The philosophical foundations of Menger’s economics have been inter- 
preted in a number of ways, including Kantian and Popperian readings.4 The 
Aristotelean interpretation appears to be the most popular, however. Given 
that Continental social theorists at the time of Menger were typically attracted 
to neo-Kantian ideas, one might have expected to find ample evidence for 
classifying Menger as a Kantian. Neo-Kantianism was not, however, the only 
‘On Schmoller, see Lifschitz (1914, pp. 199-253); on both Schmoller and Menger, see Rime1 
(1950). There are other questionable simplifications in the popular picture of this period in 
German-language economic thought. One is the idea that Menger’s Gundsiitze marked a radical 
break from German economics; for a challenge of this idea, see Streissler (1990). 
3The present exercise is part of a larger project in which I attempt to interpret and reconstruct 
aspects of economic theorizing, including the Austrian approach, in terms of a realist philosophy 
of science tailored to acknowledging the peculiarities of economics. (See, e.g. Maki, 1989, 1990a,b, 
1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995.) 
“For a Kantian interpretation, see Dobretsberger (1949). Dobretsberger admits that Menger 
makes no references to Kant-while there are several to Aristotle-but still argues that Menger 
subscribes to a Kantian idea that an economic law is a mental imposition, ‘an unreal construction 
of our thinking’ (‘eine unwirkliche Konstruktion unseres Denkens’; p. 78). It is precisely this idea 
that will be challenged by the argument of the present paper (while a Kantian reading would be 
more plausible in the case of Schmoller). For a Popperian reading, see Milford (1989, 1990). 
Interesting as this anachronistic reading is, I am not convinced that it can be carried out without 
some major distortion of Menger’s writings. 
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doctrine that had gained wide currency. The intellectual atmosphere in the 
Austria of those days contained a strong Aristotelean current, not only in the 
form of popular philosophy, but also inherent in the tradition of social science 
texts. It can be argued that from his school years onwards it was likely that 
Menger was exposed to Aristotelean influences to such an extent that he found 
it unnecessary to document in detail the Aristotelean sources of his views.5 
The present paper is not an exercise in historical scholarship, trying to put 
Menger’s texts in such historical contexts. It is rather an attempt to provide a 
systematic reading of his texts-most importantly his Untersuchungen-in 
largely Aristotelean terms. Earlier or contemporary discussions of Menger’s 
philosophical views from the viewpoint of Aristotelean essentialism include, 
e.g. Kauder (1957), Bostaph (1978), Smith (1990) (see also Maki, 1990a,b). 
However, a detailed and systematic Aristotelean reading of Menger’s conception 
of economics as an exact science is still missing. The novelty of the present paper 
lies in that, first, it is preoccupied with a detailed interpretation of Menger’s 
‘exact science’ view of economics as being based on a realist notion of universals, 
and that, second, tools utilized for this purpose are partly modern, mostly 
borrowed from recent scientific realist work on universals and laws (Armstrong, 
1978a,b; Dretske, 1977; Tooley, 1977, 1987), whereas the earlier efforts have 
been more sketchy and have adopted the old Aristotelean perspectives.6 
4. This paper is an interpretive and reconstructive study in the metaphysical 
foundations of the economics of Carl Menger. The proposal to be made is 
simple: what Menger calls exact types in economics can be interpreted as complex 
universals in the immanent realist sense, and what he calls exact laws are relations 
between these universals. 
This proposal, I believe, makes sense as a plausible interpretation of 
Menger’s unsystematic and sometimes ambiguous statements. The proposal 
also brings up a badly neglected topic in recent writing on the philosophy of 
economics in general: the problem of universals. A detailed analysis of the 
contribution of the major combatant in the most famous methodological 
debate in the history of economics may provide some tools and inspiration for 
similar analyses in the context of other traditions and periods in economics. 
sSee, e.g. Kauder (1957) and Smith (1986). For very interesting suggested qualifications, see 
Silverman (1990). 
61t is notable that in a recent conference on the legacy of Menger, two of the four papers on 
Menger’s methodology did not acknowledge Menger’s Aristoteleanism (Milford (1990); Bimer 
(1990); the other two papers are Smith (1990) and Maki (1990b)). Given what we now understand 
of Menger’s views (which is not very much, after all), I am tentatively inclined to consider such 
acknowledgement indispensable in any analysis which wishes to retain the authenticity of Menger’s 
own methodology. Of course, the scholarship on Menger may have other legitimate aims as well. 
Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that none of these interpretations i  based on the totality of 
evidence that is currently available. The unexamined portion of evidence is included in the Carl 
Menger Papers (notebooks, manuscripts, correspondence) that have recently been made accessible 
in Duke University’s Perkins Library. It will be seen whether interesting revisions will be suggested 
by examinations of relevant parts of this material. 
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5. A couple of qualifications are needed to clarify the aim of this paper and 
to narrow down its focus. Menger (1963)( 1883), p. 55) wrote that ‘[t]he purpose 
of the theoretical sciences is understanding of the real world, knowledge of it 
extending beyond immediate experience, and control of it’. What is here 
translated as ‘knowledge’ is what Menger calls Erkenntnis; it is something that 
makes it possible to predict, to infer from statements about occurrences of 
particular phenomena to statements concerning other phenomena. Control is 
based on this kind of predictive knowledge. I will not be concerned with either 
of these two aims of research in this paper. My concern is closer to Menger’s 
idea of Verstiindnis, translated above as ‘understanding’. This, I am inclined 
to think, is not to be confused with the hermeneutic Verstehen, since 
Menger seems to have in mind scientific understanding in a more general sense.7 
This is why I think it would be wiser to relate Menger’s idea of understanding 
to a particular notion of explanation, elaborated in the spirit of some kind 
of essentialist realism. [I have attempted to do this in Maki (1990a).] 
The present paper seeks to clarify the nature of the categories and statements 
of law that Menger thought would best serve the purpose of explanatory 
understanding. 
6. At this point a further qualification has to be made. It is based on the 
distinction between theory and its application. This is what Menger obviously 
had in mind when he wrote in his polemic against the historicists that ‘the 
theoretical understanding of concrete economic phenomena is especially to be 
distinguished from the theory of the economy’ (Menger, 1963 (1883) p. 45). 
The relation between the two may be characterized as that of application, ‘the 
theory of the economy’ being applied to phenomena in order to understand or 
explain them, in order to acquire ‘theoretical understanding of concrete 
economic phenomena’. The discussion to follow will be primarily restricted to 
‘the theory of the economy’, its structure and ontological character. Only 
occasionally will some remarks be made on the application of theory to the 
explanation of economic phenomena. 
7. The structure of the paper is simple. The next section is devoted to a 
discussion of exact types. The third section is concerned with exact laws. The 
final section contains some general remarks about economics as an exact 
science in Menger’s sense. 
2. Exact Types as Universals 
1. That the notion of ‘type’ and particularly the notion of ‘exact’ or ‘strict’ 
type is constitutive of Menger’s methodological view becomes evident in the 
‘On this, I disagree with Alter (1990, p. 81), who suggests that Verstlindnis is to be understood 
as Verstehen in a henneneutic sense. 
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early pages of his Untersuchungen. On the second page of the first chapter he 
writes as follows: 
In spite of the great variety of concrete phenomena, we are able, even with cursory 
observation, to perceive that not every single phenomenon exhibits a particular 
empirical form different from that of all others. Experience teaches us, rather, that 
definite phenomena are repeated now with greater exactitude, now with lesser, and 
recur in the variation of things. We call these empirical forms types. (Menger, 1963 
(1883), p. 36.) 
As examples of ‘types’ Menger (lot. cit.) mentions ‘the phenomena of purchase, 
of money, of supply and demand, of price, of capital, of rate of interest’. 
2. The above ‘definition’ of the concept of type and the subsequent role it 
plays in his system suggests that Menger formulates his methodological views 
in terms of the classical problem of universals. Types as the recurring aspects of 
things are the universals which are exemplified by concrete entities and 
phenomena, the particulars. To put it in classical terms, a universal is the one, 
particulars are the many, and consequently economic theory, being concerned 
with economic types like money and price, is about the one in the many. 
It is also noteworthy that Menger thinks of types as forms of phenomena 
(Erscheinungsformen): forms are the Aristotelean universals. This terminology 
has some consequences for characterizing Menger’s methodology from a 
comparative perspective. I will return to this point briefly towards the end of the 
paper. 
3. In order to put this idea in richer terms and to get closer to Menger’s 
conception of economics as an exact science, the next move is to introduce his 
distinction between ‘real’ types and ‘exact’ or ‘strict’ types. This is how he 
characterizes the difference between the two: While exact types are pure forms of 
things and phenomena which embody only general features and allow no 
development, real types are characterized by both general and particular features 
as well as development (ibid., p. 57). Examples of real types include ‘real gold, 
real oxygen and hydrogen, real water’, substances which ‘in their full empirical 
reality’ (ibid., p. 58) exemplify such strict types as ‘absolutely pure oxygen, pure 
alcohol, pure gold, a person pursuing only economic aims, etc.’ (ibid., p. 61). 
Menger’s distinction is not as clear as it could be, and his examples fail to 
help us organize our thoughts about the theoretical categories of economics in 
any detailed way. Perhaps the following example will illuminate Menger’s 
distinction. Think of money. This particular penny and the cheque book in my 
pocket now belong to the category of money. They are particular instances of 
money, they are money tokens. Coins in general, bank notes and cheques in 
general, and, earlier in history, cattle and shells in general, are to be likewise 
categorized as money. But they are not money tokens; they may be called 
generic instances of money. It is these generic instances, I suggest, that Menger 
had in mind when talking about ‘real types’. They embody both the general 
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features of money and some of its more specific manifestations (though the 
individual or unique features of money particulars have been put aside). In 
addition, these generic instances develop, as the history of money indicates. All 
this amounts to suggesting a three-fold distinction between universals and their 
generic and particular exemplifications.8 
Thus real types are not the true universals. Exact or strict types are. Money 
in general is one of these universals, exemplified by its particular and generic 
instances. The money universal has been purified from particularities in the 
form of which we encounter it in daily life. Consequently, the money universal 
is not observable in isolation from its particular instantiations, yet it is one of 
the abstract referents of economics as an ‘exact’ science. 
4. I suggest hat insofar as we attempt to understand Menger’s position in 
terms of the problem of universals, we should talk about economic universals. 
Economic universals involve economizing action on the part of individual 
agents. Economic price, a person pursuing only economizing activities and the 
like are among the economic universals in this sense. In contrast, market prices 
actually paid and businessmen engaged in ‘non-economic’ activities are not 
economic universals though they may be economic empirical types. 
In his Grundsiitze, Menger defined economizing action in terms of scarcity, 
fullest possible needs satisfaction, perfect information and self-interest. People 
engage in the activity of economizing if ‘the requirements for a good, in the time 
period over which the provident activity of men is to extend, are greater than 
the quantity of it available to them for that time period, and if they endeavour 
to satisfy their needs for it as completely as possible in the given circumstances 
[...I’ (Menger, 1976 (1871), p. 114). Moreover, ‘where the available quantity 
does not suffice for all, every individual will attempt to secure his own 
requirements as completely as possible to the exclusion of others’ (ibid., p. 97). 
Finally, exact theory presupposes ‘not only the dogma of ever-constant 
self-interest, but also the dogma of the “infallibility” and “omniscience” of 
humans in economic matters’ (Menger, 1963 (1883), p. 84). 
It is exact economic theory which then ‘teaches us to follow and understand 
in an exact way the manifestations of human self-interest in the efforts of 
economic humans aimed at the provision of their material needs’ (Menger, 1963 
(1883) p. 87). However, it ‘cannot provide understanding of human phenom- 
ena in their totality or of a concrete portion thereof, but it can provide 
understanding of one of the most important sides of human life [...I, the 
economic’ (ibid.; emphasis in the original). Menger goes on by explaining that 
‘the understanding of the remaining sides of it could only be attained by other 
theories which would make us aware of the formations of human life from the 
‘Milford (1990, pp. 22&227), suggests that Menger’s ‘real types’ are ‘individuals’ or ‘particulars’. 
My suggestion of a three-fold distinction implies that I find this view mistaken. For an analysis of 
the metaphysics of money in Menger, see MSki (1990b). 
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point of view of the remaining propensities’ (ibid.). Among these other 
‘propensities’ he cites ‘custom, public spirit, feeling for justice, and love for 
one’s fellow man’ as well as ‘error’ and ‘ignorance’ (ibid., p. 84). The actual 
behaviour of people and economies ‘in its full empirical reality’ manifests these 
other aspects to a greater or lesser degree. For example, while ‘economic prices’ 
only manifest economizing action, actual empirical prices are ‘more or less 
different from the economic’ (ibid., p. 71), because they also manifest these 
other propensities. 
5. The rest of this section will be devoted to some questions concerning the 
sorts and character of exact types understood as universals. Let us begin by 
asking what kinds of economic universals there are and restrict our brief 
discussion to three sorts: monadic properties, relations and substances. Among 
philosophers, monadic properties seem to be the least controversial case, while 
the status of relations and substances or kinds is more controversial (see, e.g. 
Armstrong, 1978b; Loux, 1978). 
How should Menger’s exact types be characterized in relation to these three 
sorts? The very term ‘type’ apparently implies that all exact types are kinds or 
substances, but we should not allow this to mislead us. A price, for instance, 
though substantial in grammatical form, is a social property of things. Demand, 
in turn, seems to be a relation between persons and things. Are there economic 
substances at all in Menger’s ontic furniture? Money, for instance, might 
appear as a promising candidate, but it seems that it can be reduced to a 
collection of properties (such as the powers to purchase and store value). Thus, 
we are able to hnd properties and relations among economic universals, but 
whether irreducible substances or kinds should also be included will be left as 
an open question. 
6. My next question concerns the character of Menger’s economic universals. 
Are they simple or complex, structured or unstructured? A universal is complex 
if it has other universals as its parts; otherwise it is simple. A universal is 
structured if the particulars which have it also have parts which have other 
universals; otherwise it is unstructured. A structured universal is relationally 
structured if it includes relations as its parts; otherwise it is non-relationally 
structured (simple additive aggregates are of this latter sort). [For these notions, 
see Armstrong (1978b), pp. 67-71.1 
It appears that none of the examples of exact types mentioned by Menger is 
simple. Each of them is complex. It also seems clear that most of them are 
structured, and relationally so. Think of price and money, the latter as reduced 
to the property of general purchasing power. They are social properties of 
things. I have elsewhere (in Maki, 1990a) suggested that for explanatory 
purposes, social properties are identified by Menger and later Austrian 
economists with what they are believed to be, namely with unintended 
‘invisible-hand’ consequences of individual human action (or, in some cases, 
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with averages or aggregates of meaningful individual entities). It is easy to see 
that identification statements of the form 
(C) Social entities are unintended consequences of actions by human individuals. 
(A) Social entities are aggregates or averages of individual entities, these latter entities 
being invested with meaning by acting individuals. 
purport to provide us with knowledge of the internal genetic structure of 
economic universals like price and money, very much like identification 
statements ‘Water is a collection of H,O molecules’ and ‘Temperature is mean 
kinetic energy’ reveal the structure of the universals water and temperature.9 
Are there unstructured complex universals in the ontic furniture of Menger’s 
exact economics? One of his major examples is depicted by ‘a person self- 
interestedly pursuing the fullest possible satisfaction of his needs’ which is best 
interpreted as (part of) homo oeconomicw. It is this fellow whose action is 
mentioned above in (C). It is by referring to homo oeconomicus that the internal 
structure of ‘market universals’ such as price and money is to be analyzed, but 
whereas the relational structure of price and money needs to be analyzed, this 
is less straightforward with respect to homo oeconomicus itself. This latter 
universal is not to be identified with a system of ‘deeper’ universals, such as 
those depicting neurophysiological items. The folk psychological framework of 
homo oeconomicus is not questioned (cf. Maki, 1990a,b). Yet, while this is fully 
obvious in the case of later Austrian economists uch as Mises, a qualification 
is required to understand Menger’s position. Menger’s theory of goods employs 
the notions of ‘need’ and ‘human nature’ (Menger, 1976 (1871) pp. 52-53), the 
connection between the two being close: ‘Needs arise from our drives and the 
drives are imbedded in our nature’ (ibid., p. 77).iO These notions (unlike, say, 
that of ‘preference’) provide an open invitation to look for the biological 
foundations of economizing action. However, Menger himself did not pursue 
this line much further, and even if he had done so, I suspect he would not have 
dispensed with all of the intentional contents of the concept of homo oeconomi- 
cus: at least part of the intentionality of homo oeconomicus would have been 
retained. 
Now even if homo oeconomicus is not supposed to be identified with a system 
of ‘deeper’ universals, this is not to say that it does not have universals as its 
parts. It does. Self-interest, maximizing and perfect information are all parts of 
the Mengerian version of homo oeconomicus. Thus, we have here a complex 
universal. But it is not structured, because those component universals- 
supposing for the time being that they can be taken as universals-are 
‘This proposal conforms with Armstrong’s (1983, p. 139) idea about the proper role of 
identification in science. 
“‘Menger goes on: ‘An imperfect satisfaction of needs leads to the stunting of our nature. Failure 
to satisfy them brings about our destruction. But to satisfy our needs is to live and prosper’ (ibid., 
p. 77). 
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attributed to the same particulars, namely human individuals, as homo 
oeconomicus itself. They are not attributed to universals like price and money, 
the structure of which they partly constitute; this is why homo oeconomicus is 
unstructured, unlike price and money which are structured. 
7. It is time to introduce a classical issue about universals: do economic 
universals exist in reality? Or are they rather linguistic or conceptual entities? 
Realists about universals think that they exist, while nominalists think that only 
particulars exist. For a realist the one is as real (or even more real) as the many, 
while for a nominalist at most the many are real. [For an up-to-date discussion 
of realism and nominalism, see Armstrong (1978a).] 
There would seem to be little doubt that Menger may be interpreted us a 
realist about economic universals. The key quotation is the following: 
The phenomena, or certain aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the 
concepts, are the object of theoretical research in the field of economics. (Menger, 
1963 (1883), p. 37n4; emphasis added.) 
Here Menger seems to take an antinominalist position. Exact types, the 
economic universals as objects of theoretical economics, are really ‘out there’. 
A terminological point follows immediately from this. Merger draws a 
contrast between ‘exact types’ and ‘real types’, which would seem to imply that 
exact types are not real. However, this obviously was not his intention. A better 
name for non-exact types might have been empirical type. In Menger’s system 
of thought, both exact and empirical types seem to be real. 
8. In order to illuminate Menger’s realism from a comparative perspective, I 
shall now invite the reader to examine the views of Max Weber and Fritz 
Machlup briefly. 
In his ‘Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy’ Weber provides a 
systematic discussion of his notion of ideal type. He says that ideal types ‘cannot 
be found empirically anywhere in reality’ (Weber, 1949, p. 90; emphasis added). 
This statement also applies to Menger’s exact types, which cannot be observed 
as such; only empirical (‘real’) types, things and properties ‘in their full 
empirical reality’, can. However, while Weber says about an ideal typical 
concept that it ‘is not a description of reality’ (lot. cit.), we may claim that this 
is not the case with the concepts of Menger’s exact economic theory; strictly or 
exactly typical concepts do purport to describe economic universals as parts or 
aspects of reality. To be more specific, while Weber says that the ideal type ‘is 
a conceptual construct [Gedankenbild] which is neither historical reality nor 
even a “true” reality’ (ibid., p. 93), we might want to say that, in a sense, 
Menger’s concepts depicting exact types seek to display the ‘true’ reality, 
namely the universals of economic life. 
Furthermore, Weber says of the ideal typical concept that ‘it is even less fitted 
to serve as a scheme under which a real situation or action is to be subsumed 
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as one instance. It has the significance of a purely ideal limiting concept with 
which the real situation or action is compared and surveyed for the explication 
of certain of its significant components’ (ibid., p. 91). Again, in contrast, for 
Menger real particular situations and actions are instances of exact types 
understood as economic universals. 
That Weber’s theory of ideal types is not only nominalist but also instru- 
mentalist is suggested by his statement that ideal types ‘are used as conceptual 
instruments for comparison with and the measurement of reality’ (ibid., p. 97) 
and that ‘the construction of abstract ideal-types recommends itself not as an 
end but as a means’ (ibid., p. 92). Thus, while it seems correct to say that 
Menger’s strictly typical concepts have semantic and epistemic ontent as they 
stand, Weber’s ideal types are relatively empty of such content. Thus, if factual 
knowledge is the end of theorizing, Menger thinks his exact theory has reached 
the end (or at least the essential part or aspect of it), whereas Weber’s ideal 
types only serve as means for attaining the end. Of course, the background 
supposition here is that the end (or the primary end) for Menger is knowledge 
of universals and for Weber it is knowledge of particulars. Weber’s instrumen- 
talism is rooted in his nominalism: he cannot imagine having knowledge of 
universals since, he thinks, universals do not exist in reality. This is why 
concepts apparently denoting universals do not do so literally for him: they 
have only an instrumental function in our theories. 
This same spirit is echoed in the more recent writings of the philosophically 
minded economist Fritz Machlup. The difference is that while Weber attempted 
to provide an alternative to Menger’s notion of exact type, Machlup offers an 
interpretation of Menger’s view. In this interpretation Machlup-incorrectly in 
my opinion-identifies exact types with Weberian ideal types or says that ‘they 
are close enough’ (Machlup, 1978, pp. 173, 231, 255). This identification 
becomes possible since Machlup, in his characteristically broad-minded 
manner, glossed over the differences between polarities such as ‘empirical- 
theoretical, concrete-abstract, givenconstructed, reality-fiction, observation- 
idealization, impure-pure’, etc. (ibid., p. 193). The suggestion aturally follows 
that we should discard the ‘type’ terminology and adopt instead ‘operational 
concept’ as equivalent to ‘real type’ and ‘mental construct’ as equivalent to 
‘ideal type’ (i.e. ‘exact type’ in Machlup’s opinion) (ibid., pp. 260-261). 
Machlup’s further remarks that ‘the real in the real type is, in my opinion, 
the set of phenomena visible, audible or tangible to the observer [...I’ and 
that ‘the ideal in the ideal type [i.e. exact type] lies in its belonging to the 
domain of ideas (ibid., pp. 259-260) reveal positivist inclinations: to have 
real existence is to be observable or ‘operational’. In Machlup’s view, ideal 
(i.e. exact) types do not have to do with reality, having more or less fictional 
and instrumental status. These suggestions are mistaken as an interpretation 
of Menger’s views. 
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9. Interpreting Menger as a realist about economic universals is not yet 
accurate enough. Statements like 
[...I pure gold, a person pursuing only economic aims, etc., exist in part only in our 
ideas (Menger, 1963 (1883), p. 61; emphasis added) 
could easily appear to be anomalous from the point of view of my interpret- 
ation. To make such statements compatible with the realist interpretation, 
distinctions have to be made within the realist camp between variants of realism 
about universals. 
It is sufficient for our purposes to distinguish between two variants. 
Transcendent realism or Platonic realism is the view that universals exist 
separately, that there is an independent realm of universals ante rem (‘before the 
thing’). This realm is independent both of our concept of it (this is the realist 
component) and of particular things (this is the transcendent component). A 
transcendent realist could not say that economic universals ‘exist in part only in 
our ideas’. Thus, Menger is not a Platonist. 
Immanent realism denies that universals could exist separately. Instead, 
universals exist in rebus (‘in the thing’); that is, only as instantiated in particular 
objects. No uninstantiated universals can have real existence. There are 
universals (this is the realist component), but they exist only as aspects of 
particular things (this is the immanent component). Universals do not therefore 
inhabit an independent realm of their own, they rather reside in particulars. 
This is the traditional Aristotelean view. 
It seems clear that Menger is an immanent realist about universals. Let me 
once more quote the key sentence from Menger: ‘The phenomena, or certain 
aspects of them, and not their linguistic image, the concepts, are the objects of 
theoretical research in the field of economics’ (ibid., p. 37n4; emphasis added). 
I have already argued that here Menger takes a realist, non-nominalist stance. 
But the emphasized words indicate that his realism is of the immanent variety. 
Elsewhere Menger talks about exact social sciences as providing us with 
‘understanding of a special side of phenomena of human activity’ (ibid., p. 62; 
emphasis added). When discussing the establishment of exact types he says that 
we do not have to consider ‘whether these in reality are present as independent 
phenomena’ (ibid., p. 60). 
Consider the examples of homo oeconomicus and economic price. It follows 
from the immanent realist suggestion that homo oeconomicus does not exist in 
itself, in the realm of independent economic universals. It may exist only as an 
aspect of particular human individuals. However, it is not the only aspect. In 
addition to having the strive for self-interested needs satisfaction, particular 
empirical individuals may also be driven, as we have seen, by ‘custom, public 
spirit, feeling for justice, and love for one’s fellow man’ (ibid., p. 84). This is why 
the complex universal homo oeconomicus is instantiated in individuals only as 
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mixed with these other aspects and hence cannot be observed as such. The same 
applies to economic prices. Actual, particular market prices are instantiations 
of economic prices (which are manifestations of the activities of economic men), 
but only in an impure form, intertwined with ‘non-economic’ influences. Thus 
economic prices exist only as aspects of particular prices and, consequently 
cannot be observed as separate ntities. 
10. The above examples involve a puzzle that deserves a separate brief 
comment. Recall that economizing action on Menger’s view is characterized 
not only by the absence of ‘custom, public spirit, feeling for justice, and love for 
one’s fellow man’ (to be studied by exact sciences other than economics) but 
also by the absence of ‘error’ and ‘ignorance’. Now we cannot say that the 
economic exact type homo oeconomicus has the universals infallibility and 
omniscience, while error and ignorance are two other universals within the 
purview of some other exact theory describing human beings, and that 
empirical individuals instantiate all these universals. We are reluctant to say of 
any given particular that it exemplifies both universal A and universal 7A. 
Now if infallibility and omniscience were to be regarded as universals, they 
may well turn out to be uninstantiated universals. This creates a problem to the 
Aristotelean interpretation, since this interpretation does not comfortably 
accommodate uninstantiated universals. Menger faces a dilemma. Either the 
ideal epistemic qualities of infallibility and omniscience are not, after all, to be 
treated as universals in the immanent realist sense, or homo oeconomicus has to 
be characterized without invoking them. The first option might lead to 
adopting the Platonic view: uninstantiated universals can more easily be dealt 
with from a transcendent perspective (another possibility might be to pursue an 
interpretation based on the metaphysics of possible worlds; see below, Section 
3.9). However-and this provides encouragement to our Aristotelean 
interpretation-it is the second option that has been prominently adopted in 
post-Mengerian Austrian economics: in subsequent versions of Austrian 
theory, economic agents are portrayed as essentially prone to error and 
ignorance. 
11. Let us now turn to the puzzle generated by Menger’s statement hat 
economic universals ‘exist in part only in our ideas’. The fundamental point is 
that while economic universals exist in reality they do not exist as separate 
realities. However, and this is the crucial step, we can think of them separately. 
We can conceive the universal aspects of things without thinking of particulars 
in all of their aspects. We abstract from the particularities of things and 
concentrate on the universals which the particulars exemplify. 
This idea is part of the Aristotelean tradition to which Menger seems to 
belong. He talks about the method of isolation and abstraction, and says that 
economic universals are ‘abstracted from the full empirical reality’ (ibid., p. 62). 
Economic universals do not exist separately but can be thought of separately if 
Universals and the Methodenstreit 487 
we abstract them from particulars and isolate them from other universals. It is 
we who carry out the abstraction and isolation.11 This, and this only, seems to 
be the sense in which universals ‘exist in part only in our ideas’. Note the 
qualification ‘in part’: universals are brought to our awareness by the cognizant 
mind by means of the active process of abstraction, but they are not created by 
the mind. Were they so created, they would exist in our ideas completely, not 
in part. 
Let us briefly return to Machlup’s view that exact types are ‘mental 
constructs’. If this were true, exact types would be creations of the economic 
theorist. To distance Menger’s ‘abstractive’ conception from Machlup’s ‘con- 
structivist’ view, consider the distinction between discovery and invention. We 
may say that economic universals are discovered by abstraction, whereas 
‘constructs’ are merely more or less useful inventions of the economic theorist. 
This is one aspect of the debate between realists and instrumentalists. Menger 
stands on the realist side of the barricade. 
3. Exact Laws as Relations Between Universals 
1. Now that we have some grasp of what Menger may have had in mind when 
he talked about exact or strict types-they are economic universals understood 
in the immanent realist sense-our task of clarifying the notion of an exact law 
will be somewhat easier. The simple idea will be that exact economic laws in 
Menger’s sense are best understood as relations between economic universals. 
Besides formulating this idea in some detail, the present section will examine 
some related questions, especially that of necessity in laws. 
2. Menger introduces the idea of an exact or strict law by first characterizing 
a typical relationship between particulars: 
[...I relationships among concrete phenomena [...I do not exhibit a thorough individu- 
ality in every single case. We are able, rather, to observe without much difficulty 
certain relationships among them recurring now with greater, now with lesser 
regularity (e.g., regularities in their succession, in their development, in their 
coexistence), relationships which we call typical. (Menger, 1963 (1883), p. 36.) 
As examples of typical relationships Menger mentions ‘the regular drop in the 
price of a commodity as a result of the increase in supply, the rise in the price 
of a commodity as a result of an increase in currency, the lowering of the rate 
of interest as a result of considerable accumulation of capital, etc.’ (lot. cit.). 
3. Analogically with the situation with regard to types, Menger distinguishes 
two subcategories within typical relationships, both of them called ‘laws’ (ibid., 
“For an account of various aspects and variants of the method of isolation, including its relation 
to abstraction, see Miiki (1992, 1994). Abstraction may be thought of as an operation in ‘vertical 
isolation’ whereby universals are isolated from the particular features of the objects that instantiate 
them. On the other hand, ‘horizontal isolation’ is an operation whereby things and their properties 
are isolated from one another at a given level of abstraction. Both operations are extensively used 
by Menger (which is almost a trivial point; they are ubiquitious in all human thought). 
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pp. 50, 57, 59). Empirical laws are recurring relationships between phenomena 
which exhibit exceptions, whereas exact laws are typical relationships which 
hold without exception. While empirical laws ‘signify merely the actual 
regularities, determined by way of observation, in the succession and in the 
coexistence of real phenomena which belong to certain empirical forms’ (i.e. to 
empirical or ‘real’ types) (ibid., p. 57) exact or strict laws ‘which in respect o 
the approaches to cognition by which we attain to them simply bear within 
themselves the guarantee of absoluteness’ (ibid., p. 59). 
To illustrate the distinction, as examples of the two kinds of laws we might 
think of a statistical demand curve as an exemple of an empirical aw, and the 
theoretical aw of demand as an example of an exact law. It is one of Menger’s 
major claims that the method followed by historicist economics-that of 
diligent data collection and inductive generalization-is, at most, able to attain 
empirical laws, and that the historicists have failed to understand the radical 
difference between the two kinds of laws. 
4. Although Menger is far from clear about this, it seems that he thinks one 
basic difference between the two kinds of laws is that while empirical laws 
connect ‘real’ or empirical types, exact laws are connections between exact or 
strict types. If this is the case, then given the proposal that exact types are 
economic universals, exact laws should be understood as relationships between 
economic universals. This would make Menger’s notion compatible with recent 
analyses of laws of nature precisely as relations between universals, realistically 
understood, these analyses having been provided as alternatives to the so-called 
Humean view of laws (see Armstrong, 1983; Dretske, 1977; Tooley, 1977; 
Tooley, 1987; Fales, 1990). We now turn to some features of laws suggested by 
these realist analyses in order to clarify some obscurities and identify some 
problems in Menger’s formulations. 
5. Let us begin with the following question: What is the relation of laws as 
relationships between universals to sequences of, or more generally, relation- 
ships between, particular phenomena? What is the relation of the law of 
demand to particular cases of the positive correlation between a rise in the 
demand for a good and the decrease in its price? Note that these particular 
prices and demands have to be instantiations of ‘economic prices’ and demands 
by economic men, the universals involved in the law of demand. 
Menger might have been ready to accept Armstrong’s (1983, pp. 88-92) 
answer that laws of nature as relations between universals are themselves 
universals which are instantiated in particular correlations as aspects of these 
particulars, just as all other universals are instantiated in particulars. And, 
according to immanent realism, laws as dyadic universals or relations do not 
have separate existence; they exist only as instantiated in particular relations 
between particular things. Thus, for instance, the law of demand does 
not exist independently of its instantiations, but only as a real aspect of 
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particular relations between particular prices and demands-these latter being 
instantiations of economic prices and demands by economic men. 
As noted earlier, Menger thinks that besides particular relations there are 
‘typical relationships’ which he divides into empirical and exact laws. Since only 
the exact laws are genuine universals, we might characterize the other two 
relationships as generic and particular instantiations thereof (cf. Section 2.3 
above): empirical laws are the generic exemplifications, while particular 
relations are the particular exemplifications of exact laws. 
6. The notion of exact laws as relations between economic universals is 
capable of making excellent sense of the idea of necessitation; this is something 
that the regularity theory of laws lacks. By briefly examining the idea of 
necessary connections we can, I think, also make Menger’s talk about the 
‘guarantee of absoluteness’ in exact laws, brought about by our ‘approach to 
cognition’ (see Section 3.3 above), a little bit more intelligible. 
Laws as relations between universals have the form, N(F, G), where F and 
G are the universals (‘F-ness’ and ‘G-ness’) and N depicts a relation of 
necessitation between them: F-ness necesssitates G-ness. Thus, a relation of 
nomic necessitation holds between universals F and G. But it also holds between 
their particular instantiations: something (which is t;3 necessitates something 
(which is G). (See Armstrong, 1983, pp. 9697.) Even though the notion of 
nomic necessitation might be taken as a primitive without much further 
explication, the idea does have some intuitive appeal. We can think of 
necessitation as rooted in what the necessitating and necessitated entities are. It 
is because something is F that it is also G. It is because of what it is that it 
cannot be otherwise. 
Let us take F to be an increase in demand and G an increase in price 
(both demand and price being the ‘economic’ ones). Both of them can be 
thought of as properties of particular goods. Necessitation between par- 
ticular increases in demands and prices holds because these particulars 
are instances of the universals F and G, and necessitation between F and G 
holds because these economic universals are certain kinds of aggregates or 
unintended consequences of individual actions (see Section 2.6 above). This is 
how we might try to understand the law of demand as involving nomic 
necessitation. 
7. There is no doubt that the idea of necessity belongs to Menger’s notion 
of exact laws. Here is some uncontroversial evidence: ‘[...I strictly typical 
phenomena of a definite kind must always and, indeed, in consideration of our 
laws of thinking, simply of necessity, be followed by strictly typical phenomena 
of just as definite and different type.’ (Menger, 1963 (1883), p. 60). Earlier we 
cited Menger’s reference to our ‘approaches to cognition by which we attain to’ 
exact laws as guaranteeing ‘absoluteness’ to those laws. Now he relates 
necessity to ‘our laws of thinking’. 
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It seems obvious that necessitation is, in Menger’s view, a feature of real 
relations between universals, and that ‘approaches to cognition’ and ‘laws 
of thinking’ do not primarily define or constitute those relations; rather, 
they are metaphysically grounded guidelines for thinking about real rela- 
tions. They might be viewed as ways of finding out the intrinsic necessity 
and ‘absoluteness’ of exact laws in the following sense. Provided that 
economic universals have been correctly isolated from other universals and 
abstracted from the flow of particular phenomena and that their internal 
structure has been correctly analyzed by means of identification 
statements-i.e. given that we know what the nature of certain items in the 
domain of economics is-we can infer the laws of their behaviour on the 
basis of this knowledge by obeying certain uncontroversial ‘laws of think- 
ing’. The metaphysical point is that given the nature of things, they 
necessarily behave in the way determined by this nature. The epistemologi- 
cal point is that given our knowledge of the nature of things we can, by 
applying the ‘laws of thinking’, infer knowledge of the ‘absolute’ laws of 
their behaviour. 
8. On the basis of the preceding discussion I can now put my view of the issue 
of apriorism in Menger’s methodology in simple terms.12 First, I take apriorism 
to be an epistemological doctrine. Second, Menger was not an apriorist about 
acquiring knowledge of exact types, since this knowledge, in his view, is to be 
abstracted from experience. Third, it is much more plausible to view Menger as 
being in a sense an apriorist about exact laws, since knowledge of them is 
derived from our experience-based abstract knowledge of exact types without 
any further recourse to experience. 
9. The final question about exact laws to be raised is concerned with what 
Menger meant when he wrote that those laws hold without exception. I will 
approach this question by borrowing the distinction between ‘iron laws’ and 
‘oaken laws’ from Armstrong (1983, pp. 147-1 SO). Iron laws ‘tell us that, given 
certain conditions, some further state of affairs is necessitated ‘I...] no matter 
what further conditions are added. If it is a case of [non-probabilistic] 
necessitation [...I, then the law issues in an exceptionless uniformity‘ (ibid., 
p. 147). On the other hand, ‘if N(F, G) is an oaken law, then all that is entailed 
is that for all x where interfering conditions are absent, if x is F, then x is G 
(ibid., p. 149). But, as a matter of fact, the relation between F and G typically 
is interfered with and, consequently, oaken laws do not result in exceptionless 
uniformities. 
It might seem that all alleged economic laws are oaken-the ceteris paribus 
clause attached to them never holds-and that Menger’s claim that exact laws 
hold without exception is exaggerated. Let us take a closer look at Menger’s 
own discussion of the situation. He gives an example concerning the relation 
‘*Here my suggestion seems to diverge from that of Smith (1986), for instance. 
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between eeds and prices and writes that ‘[t]he exact law states that with definite 
presuppositions an increase in need, definite in measure, must be followed by an 
increase in prices just as definite in measure’ (Menger, 1963 (1883), p. 72). 
Among the required presuppositions Menger mentions, as properties charac- 
terizing economic agents, egoistic maximization, full relevant information, 
epistemic ertainty and freedom from external force (ibid., p. 71). He goes on to 
make the self-evident admission that ‘the above presuppositions in real 
economy all hold only in rare cases and that therefore as a rule real prices 
deviate more or less from economic ones’. The same is put in general terms as 
follows: ‘[...I the results of exact research [...I are true only with certain 
presuppositions, with presuppositions which in reality do not always apply’ 
(ibid., p. 69). 
There seems to be a problem here. I submit that we have two options in 
attempting a resolution; either reject or at least modify my reconstructive 
interpretation of exact types and laws in terms of universals, or reject Menger’s 
claim that exact laws do not, by definition, exhibit any exceptions. I will now 
briefly discuss these two options. 
We could let Menger retain his claim about the exceptionlessness of exact 
laws if we reinterpreted his view in terms of the metaphysics of possible 
worlds. On this interpretation, Menger would have postulated a non-actual 
possible world of Wirtschaflichkeit where all the presuppositions about the 
properties of economic agents would be true, without being true in the actual 
world. In this non-actual world exact laws as manifestations of the activities 
of economic men would also hold without exception. This interpretation 
diverges from the one pursued in this paper in that in postulating universals 
we can remain within the boundaries of the actual world as no need to 
postulate possibilia arises. The possibilist, non-actualist interpretation also 
encounters additional problems of filling in the gap between economic theory 
(concerning a non-actual possible world) and its application (to the actual 
world). 
I am, at least tentatively, in favour of the other option. This means that 
I recommend we retain our actualist interpretation in terms of universals, 
and suggest hat exact laws are oaken laws and, further, that Menger should 
not have made his claim of exceptionlessness as a defining feature of exact 
laws. This revisionist proposal is not as dramatic as it may sound. Nothing 
would follow from it about the important notion of intrinsic necessitation, 
since the relationship N(F, G) holds in the case of iron laws as well as oaken 
laws. The difference is that the uniformity (x)(Faz~Gx) does not hold for 
oaken laws while it does hold for iron laws. There would also be no reason 
to be ashamed of economic exact laws, if such things existed: they would 
be in this respect no worse than Newton’s First Law which is an oaken 
law. 
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4. Economics as an Exact Science 
1. In this brief final section I will summarize my interpretation of Menger’s 
defense of the relative autonomy of theoretical economics, based on his view of 
economics as an exact science. I begin with a few words about the objects of 
theoretical economics. According to Menger’s conception, economic theory is 
concerned with exact types and exact laws as universals having real existence 
as aspects of particular things and relations. The objects of exact theories are 
best understood as economic universals and their relations, manifesting the 
economizing activities of people. 
2. Exact economic theory is likewise to be understood in a realist manner: 
exact theory is an allegedly true representation of real economic universals. It 
is to be noted that Menger later made a distinction between what he called 
‘morphological’ and ‘theoretical’ sciences (Menger, 1889). On this terminol- 
ogy, morphology is about types, while theory is about their laws. However, 
this does not perturb the realism presupposed by conceptual representation 
in that both morphology and theory are about real objects and, one hopes, 
true of them. We can now see that the abstractness of theory (in the sense 
that it denotes universals) is compatible with its being realistic. Historicists 
cannot be permitted the sole claim to realisticness on philosophical 
grounds. 
3. The construction of exact economic theory (or morphology and theory) is 
a matter of discovery. Exact types are discovered by using abstractive isolation. 
This is an operation leading to knowledge that is a posteriori with regard to 
empirical experience. Exact laws in turn are discovered by constructing a theory 
on the basis of our ‘morphological’ knowledge of exact types. This is at least 
partly a matter of intensional inference (as opposed to the ordinary extensional 
inference of mathematical logic): the theory of exact laws is derived from the 
conceptual contents of the categories we use to denote exact types. This is an 
a priori operation. 
4. The feature in Menger’s methodology which may have caused most 
anxiety among some commentators is the view that no separate retrospective 
justification based on empirical evidence is required by him for the acceptance 
of an exact theory. He seems to think that it is the way theory has been 
constructed that guarantees its reliability. Unfortunately, although Menger was 
definite about Schmoller’s flaws in questions of the construction and justifi- 
cation of economic theory (see Menger, 1884), he never himself formulated his 
own view in sufficient detail. 
5. Menger’s negative view of retrospective mpirical testing is related to his 
conception of particulars as conjunctures of several (sorts of) universals. Each 
science studies only one sort of universals; thus, economics is interested only in 
economic universals. It follows that in order to explain particular social 
phenomena in detail scientists have to resort to insights from all relevant exact 
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social sciences about the universals studied by them (for qualifications, see 
Maki, 1990a). It also follows that no knowledge concerning particular phenom- 
ena as such can be used as straightforward evidence for one or another exact 
theory. 
6. Our pursuit of a coherent interpretation of Menger’s exact science view of 
economics has helped illuminate two problematic elements that do not quite fit 
in the picture. One element is in his economic theory, namely the attribution of 
infallibility and omniscience to economic actors. Subsequent developments in 
the tradition that Menger started have revised his theory on this matter. The 
second problematic element is in his metatheory, namely his claim that exact 
economic laws hold without exception. We saw that this claim can be rejected 
without giving up the idea of necessitation characteristic of exact laws 
understood as universals. 
7. Menger’s characterization of his economic theory as ‘exact’ and ‘formal’ is 
unusual from the present standpoint, since ‘exact’ and ‘formal’ are nowadays 
taken to mean virtually the opposite of what Menger, with his aversion to 
mathematics in economics, had in mind. But his usage differed from that of his 
influential contemporaries, too. Leon Walras’s mathematical theory of general 
economic equilibrium certainly was formal in one sense, but Menger, critical of 
Walras’s theory, thought it was his own non-mathematical theory that was 
appropriately formal, since it was about a special set of Aristotelean forms, the 
economic universals. On the other hand, J. S. Mill characterized political 
economy as an ‘inexact’ science, because accurate descriptions of particular 
phenomena could not be derived from its theories (see Hausman, 1981). 
Menger agreed on the premise of Mill’s characterization: economics is able to 
convey only inexact knowledge about particulars. But he did not agree on its 
conclusion: he believed that theoretical economics is able to convey exact 
knowledge about universals. 
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